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Transnational Litigation in American
Courts: An Overview of Problems and
Issues*
Robert B. von Mehren**
I. Introduction
At the outset, it should be emphasized that to be an effective
counselor in the area of transnational litigation, one must have some
background in comparative law and some understanding of other le-
gal systems. Nothing limits both the preparation and prosecution of
transnational litigation more than the reflex conclusion that if one is
a plaintiff, one should always seek to litigate in an American juris-
diction. Similarly limiting is the idea that, if one is litigating in an
American court, there is little need to understand much or any of
the non-American aspects of the case.
As a general rule, it is fair to say that courts of the United
States, and perhaps particularly those of New York, have long been
favored by American plaintiffs as a forum for transnational litiga-
tion. Selection of an American forum, however, should not be auto-
matic. Careful consideration must be given to the choice of a forum,
whether the forum is stipulated by the parties before litigation is in
prospect or chosen by the plaintiff when he institutes an action. Cer-
tain factors which are relevant to the choice of forum include juris-
dictional requirements, litigation costs, procedural rules, and
whether it will be necessary to prove foreign law.' Foreign litigants
using United States courts must also consider whether to sue in a
state or federal court. In most transnational cases, the latter will
* This Article is based on a paper delivered at the 1984 Symposium of The
Southwestern Legal Foundation held in June 1984. Copyright c 1985 by Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc. and reprinted with permission from SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE
ON PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD (1985).
** Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City. B.A. 1943, Yale; LL.B. 1946,
Harvard; President, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 59; Law Clerk to Judge Learned Hand (Octo-
ber 1946 Term); Law Clerk to Justice Stanley F. Reed (October 1947 Term); President,
American Branch of the International Law Association; President, Practising Law Institute;
Member, Board of Editors, American Journal of International Law.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Margaret Cole of the New York Bar and
Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and to Jonathan H. Hines and Robert N.
Shwartz, both of the New York Bar, for their assistance in preparing this paper.
I. For example, a foreign plaintiff suing in a United States court must be prepared to
deal with extensive discovery procedures and the possibility of a jury trial.
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have jurisdiction on the basis of diversity.
II. Initial Considerations
A. Obtaining Jurisdiction
A court has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant if the
defendant is personally served within the court's jurisdiction. This is
because a court is considered to have power over all persons within
its jurisdiction.2 Domiciliaries are also subject to jurisdiction under
this theory.
In the context of transnational litigation, however, domicile is
often unavailable as a basis for jurisdiction. Accordingly, the only
alternative may be personal service on a defendant who is tempora-
rily present in a particular jurisdiction. This approach not only is
subject to criticism,3 but it may also be subject to some doubt follow-
ing the Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.4 Shaffer ap-
plied the minimum contacts analysis of the decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington5 to in rem cases. If the Shaffer rationale is
expanded to require minimum contacts in all cases, jurisdiction
based on service while "flying over the jurisdiction" may well
disappear.6
If jurisdiction cannot be based on personal presence, it may still
be established by recourse to the "minimum contacts" rule enunci-
ated in International Shoe7 which essentially states that a defendant,
although not present, may still be subject to jurisdiction if he has
"minimum contacts" with the forum.8 The minimum contacts test is
based on "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"9
and, consequently, although "minimum contacts" may be liberally
interpreted, jurisdiction will not be established by reliance on fortui-
tous contacts which the defendant did not actually establish.10
A recurrent problem of particular importance in transnational
2. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 'Power'
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
4. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. But see Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980). Here the
Georgia Supreme Court held that personal presence, however temporary, is sufficient for mini-
mum contacts. The interesting aspect of this case is that the trial court held that the defen-
dant's temporary presence in Georgia when served with process was not a sufficient contact to
establish jurisdiction. Although reversed on appeal, the lower court's decision may be the fore-
runner of arguments to come.
7. 326 U.S. at 316.
8. For example, conducting business within a jurisdiction establishes minimum
contacts.
9. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
10. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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litigation concerns assertion of jurisdiction over a parent corporation
based on the activities of its subsidiary within the jurisdiction. The
validity of such jurisdiction depends on the degree of independence
exercised by the subsidiary. If the subsidiary has no individual iden-
tity and its corporate status is purely formal, then jurisdiction may
be had over the parent.11
Although it is impossible to list all the circumstances that con-
stitute minimum contacts with the jurisdiction, a few examples in-
clude: Maintenance of an office; employment of salesmen (other than
independent contractors); and active solicitation of business. Two ad-
ditional factors should be considered by a plaintiff in transnational
litigation. First, if the cause of action in question arises under a fed-
eral statute that contemplates nationwide service of process, mini-
mum contacts are required with the United States, not with the state
in which the court is sitting. 2 Second, even if jurisdiction is estab-
lished, a court may refuse to hear the matter on the basis of forum
non conveniens.
B. Consideration of "Forum Non Conveniens"
United States courts may refuse to hear a case over which they
have jurisdiction if the forum is "inconvenient." The factors to be
weighed in determining whether a forum is inconvenient were set
forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.3 These factors include ease of
access to proof, costs of obtaining willing witnesses, the availability
of methods to compel unwilling witnesses, the possibility of visiting
any relevant site, and the public interest in avoiding overburdening
courts with cases more appropriately heard elsewhere. Convenience
and the "interests of substantial justice"" are the bases of the
doctrine.
Two factors will always weigh heavily in favor of retaining a
case. First, the plaintiff has chosen the forum, and this choice, unless
blatantly abusive, should not lightly be overridden. Second, a suit
will not be dismissed if it cannot be brought elsewhere.' 5
Certain factors, although significant to the litigants, will not be
considered in evaluating the appropriateness of the forum. For exam-
ple, the court will not accept plaintiff's suit merely because the pro-
11. TACA Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce, 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1965). A similar line of reasoning is pursued in Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co.,
508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. N.Y. 1981).
12. Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 3555 (1984).
13. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). However, Congress empowered district court
judges to transfer the action to another district where the action might have been brought. Id.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 comment c (1971).
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cedural law to be applied in another jurisdiction will be more or less
favorable.16 Moreover, the policy of evenhandedness as reflected in
statutes such as Rule 327 of the New York Civil Law Practice and
Rules17 makes it clear that an earlier New York practice of refusing
to dismiss a case for forum non conveniens when the plaintiff was a
New York resident should not be followed.
Thus, although United States courts, particularly those in New
York, have traditionally been receptive to suits having minimal con-
tacts with their jurisdiction, careful consideration should be given to
instituting an action in those courts if they are in reality an "incon-
venient forum."
C. Service of Summons
Once a plaintiff has decided that jurisdiction is both available
and likely to be maintained in the forum, very pragmatic considera-
tions of the procedural mechanics of the litigation must be reviewed.
1. Federal.-Service of summons under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is governed by Rule 4. Pursuant to Rule 4, if the
party to be served is not an inhabitant of or found within the state
where the court is sitting, service may be made under the rules of
the state in which the court is sitting or, if there is a United States
statute authorizing service, pursuant to that federal statute. 8 Alter-
native provisions for service in a foreign country are found in Rule
4(i), which provides for service either in the manner provided by the
law of the foreign country, as directed by the foreign authority in
response to letters rogatory, or by personal service.
2. States.-The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules pro-
vides a typical example of state rules that authorize extraterritorial
service. Rule 31319 authorizes service outside New York if the defen-
dant is a New York domiciliary or if a basis for jurisdiction exists
under either Rule 301,20 regarding doing business within the state,
or Rule 302,21 regarding contractual submission to jurisdiction. Stat-
utes such as 301 and 302 are referred to as "long arm statutes" and
have been widely adopted in the United States. They give broad au-
16. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
17. When the court finds that in the interests of substantial justice the action should be
heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action
in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. The domicile or residence in this state
of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 327 (McKinney 1972).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
19. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. 313 (McKinney 1972).
20. Id. R. 301.
21. Id. R. 302.
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thority for service of process. 2 Such latitude can be of great value to
the plaintiff in a transnational dispute if the defendant is difficult to
locate.
D. Other Considerations
While most often considered only when a case is in litigation,
private international law issues should not be overlooked when se-
lecting a forum. There are significant advantages to having a case
tried in the forum whose law will govern. Thorny problems involving
proof of foreign law will thereby be avoided. Trial in such a forum
not only contributes to a more accurate application of controlling
law, but also saves time in the trial itself.2 3 These comments are of
particular force if the law to be applied is in a foreign language or is
from a civil law jurisdiction.
Other factors to be considered include speed and cost. In the
United States, many federal and state courts are congested. Al-
though the "explosion" of litigation may be overstated, 4 in 1981 the
duration of federal civil cases averaged 1.16 years,25 and delays of
more than five years were "all too common. ' 26 The more complex
the litigation, the longer this period is likely to be. If problems of
gathering evidence from abroad, proving foreign law, and other com-
mon aspects of transnational litigation must be addressed, the dura-
tion of a case may be significantly longer.
Some considerations relate particularly to procedure in United
States courts. Pretrial discovery is widely available in the United
States and the scope of such discovery is very broad. 7 A proponent
may require all information which "appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 12 In contrast, discovery
in the United Kingdom is more restrictive insofar as it does not allow
22. Authority for service of process under long arm statutes usually is limited only by
due process.
23. The relationship between the forum chosen and controlling law is also a factor to
be weighed in considering forum non conveniens:
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial . . . in a forum that is at
home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in
some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself.
330 U.S. at 509. (The statement quoted above was made in the context of federal diver-
sity of citizenship cases, but would be even more appropriate in transnational litigation.)
24. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4 (1983); Trubeck, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72 (1983).
25. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District
Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 80 (1981).
26. Hufstedler & Nejelski, ABA Action Committee Challenges Litigation Cost and
Delay, 66 A.B.A.J. 965, 966 (1980).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See also infra pp. 48-50.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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"a party to 'fish' for witnesses or for a new case.""
Availability of a jury trial is also an important factor. Even in
commercial disputes in the United States, juries are the rule rather
than the exception. This is not the case in the United Kingdom. Ad-
ditionally, United States courts keep no separate commercial causes
list as do courts in the United Kingdom. 30 In civil law countries,
juries are not available at all.
Finally, the enforceability in one jurisdiction of a judgment ob-
tained in another jurisdiction may affect choice of forum."1 A
favorable judgment is a Pyrrhic victory indeed if the jurisdiction in
which assets are found refuses to aid in enforcement. Since the
United States is not party to any reciprocal enforcement arrange-
ments, resort must be made to the internal law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion to enforce an American judgment abroad. Enforcement may be
precluded in those cases in which United States laws are considered
to be against public policy or ordre publique.3
III. Preparing the Case for Trial-Discovery
Once a transnational case has been commenced in an American
court and, if necessary, has successfully withstood any motions ad-
dressed to jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, service of process, and
sufficiency of pleadings, the parties face the expensive and time con-
suming prospect of pretrial discovery-"American style." Many
American judges and lawyers join their foreign colleagues in criticiz-
ing American discovery practices as excessive.3 3 Whatever one's view
may be, it is clear that in transnational litigation pretrial discovery
often presents some of the most difficult and challenging aspects of
the litigation.
A. The American Approach
The scope of pretrial discovery in American courts is defined in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' In the United States, the
pace and scope of pretrial discovery are set, at least in the first in-
29. 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 38 (Butterworths 4th ed. 1975).
30. See Administration of Justice Act, 1970, ch. 31, § 3(1) (U.K.).
31. See infra pp. 64-66.
32. Ordre publique is the term given in civil law countries to the concept known in the
United States as "public policy."
33. For comparative analysis of American and foreign discovery procedures and other
comments on discovery abroad, see R. von Mehren, Discovery of Documentary and Other
Evidence in a Foreign Country: Perspective of the U.S. Private Practitioner, reprinted in Ex-
TRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSEs THERETO 194 (C. Olmstead ed.
1985); R. von Mehren, Discovery of Documentary and Other Evidence in a Foreign Country,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 896 (1983); R. von Mehren, Discovery Abroad: The Perspective of the
U.S. Private Practitioner, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 985 (1984).
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Because of its greater importance and current develop-
ments in the area, this discussion is limited to party discovery.
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stance, by the parties, not the court. Resort to judicial supervision of
pretrial discovery occurs only when a dispute arises between counsel.
The scope of permissible discovery in American litigation is deliber-
ately broad. The scope of discovery in the United States is, in fact,
much broader than in any other jurisdiction. For instance, discovery
of documentary evidence in some European countries is limited to
documents that, when drafted, were intended to be evidence of the
underlying transaction. Under Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding the mat-
ter . . . which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action."3 5 Inadmissible information may be sought through dis-
covery "if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 36
From the European perspective, the scope of American pretrial
discovery is almost without limit. Understandably, European law-
makers and courts have reacted with some hostility when confronted
with such unparalleled discovery demands from the United States.
The promulgation of so-called "blocking statutes"3 by most Euro-
pean countries is perhaps the most prominent manifestation of this
hostility.
In response to what they perceive as over-broad American pre-
trial discovery procedures, many foreign governments have enacted
legislation designed to prevent the release of certain evidence sought
from abroad. For example, section two of the Protection of Trading
Interests Act of 198038 (PTIA) empowers the British Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry to give directions prohibiting compli-
ance with an order of an overseas court requiring production of in-
formation if the order "infringes the jurisdiction of the United King-
dom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom." 39
A blocking statute such as the Protection of Trading Interests
Act of 1980 can be a two-edged sword. While they may be used to
prevent an American court from compelling production of docu-
ments and other information sought from abroad, they can just as
often leave a European national who is doing business in the United
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
36. Id.
37. See generally, O'Kane & O'Kane, Taking Depositions Abroad: The Problems Still
Remain, 31 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 343 (1981); Myrick & Love, Obtaining Evidence Abroad
For Use In United States Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 585 (1981); Batista, Confronting Foreign
"Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-Resident Parties to Ameri-
can Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61 (1983); Light, Discovery Abroad and the Consequences
When Discovery is Not Possible, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 577 (1982); Stein, Depositions in Foreign
Jurisdictions: "Innocence Abroad", 7 LITIGATION 14 (Spring 1981).
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States unable to defend himself effectively. When a European com-
pany doing business in the United States becomes embroiled in liti-
gation in this country, it may need information or documents located
in its home office. Some blocking statutes may impede the company's
ability to obtain such information.
B. Changing American Attitudes
The American legal community has recently begun to reflect
upon the legitimacy of "Discovery American Style" as applied to
transnational litigation pending in American courts. This movement,
while still not fully developed, promises a potential working solution
to the conflict between America's unusually broad pretrial discovery
and foreign states' reaction to what is perceived as an unwarranted
intrusion into their sovereign affairs. Signs of this new response are
evident in several different contexts: Section 420 of the Restatement
(Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Tentative
Draft No. 3, March 15, 1982), "Requests for Disclosure and Foreign
Government Compulsion" (the Restatement);40 the August 1, 1983
amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
41
and recent interpretations by the American courts of the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters (the Convention).4
1. The Restatement.-The tentative draft of the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States suggests a new Amer-
ican approach to taking discovery abroad. Section 420 addresses dif-
ficulties involved in seeking discovery in the face of blocking statutes
or other foreign government restrictions on production of such dis-
covery. The Restatement recognizes that seeking discovery abroad
necessarily involves sovereign interests of jurisdictions other than the
United States. From this premise, the Restatement seeks to modify
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to conform more
fully with general principles of international law. The recognition
that discovery in transnational litigation involves competing interests
not present in domestic litigation is an important first step toward
reducing the friction that United States discovery demands abroad
have often created in the past.
Section 420 states that a party to an American lawsuit may be
requested to produce documents or information located outside the
40. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 420 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; see also infra notes 43-49 and accom-
panying text.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (as amended).
42. See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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United States. The Restatement, however, goes on to impose two im-
portant limitations on the scope of foreign discovery that would not
normally apply in a domestic context. First, it would require a court
order before discovery abroad is authorized. Second, it would limit
discovery of documents and other information to that which is "di-
rectly relevant, necessary, and material to an action or in-
vestigation.
4 3
The first limitation which ensures prior review by a neutral judi-
cial officer of all discovery demands seeking foreign documents or
information does not necessarily change the scope of American pre-
trial discovery. It does, however, emphasize the difference between
transnational and domestic litigation. Implicitly it imposes an added
element of self-restraint upon any American litigant seeking discov-
ery abroad. In addition, this limitation serves notice on the courts
that circumstances surrounding foreign discovery requests merit spe-
cial attention. Hopefully courts entrusted with such responsibility
will insist that demands for discovery abroad be narrowed and clari-
fied wherever possible.
The second limitation imposes a more stringent test of relevance
than is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) by
requiring a party to limit his demands for discovery abroad to those
materials essential to the proof of his case. This restriction does have
a significant effect on the scope of discovery abroad.
In addition to limiting discovery abroad, Section 420 of the Re-
statement recognizes that there will be circumstances when it is
nonetheless appropriate for an American court to' order production
of documents or other information located outside the United States.
In these circumstances, the Restatement addresses the question of
what sanctions are appropriate when the party to whom the discov-
ery order was directed has failed to comply. In American domestic
litigation, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines
the appropriate range of sanctions, including adverse findings of fact,
contempt, or dismissal of a plaintiff's action, or a defendant's coun-
terclaims or defenses."" The Restatement recognizes that the same
range of possible sanctions exists in transnational litigation, although
it would not impose certain sanctions when the party has made a
good faith effort to comply with the court's order but nevertheless
failed to produce the information. The Restatement would thus bar
imposition of "contempt, dismissal or default on the party that has
failed to comply . . . except in cases of deliberate concealment or
removal of information or a failure to make a good faith effort
43. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 420(1)(a)
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
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It is reasonable to expect that courts will give consideration to a
number of factors in fashioning the appropriate sanction for a party
who has failed to comply with a discovery order. Such factors would
include the importance of the particular material sought, the speci-
ficity of the request for documents or information, the interests an-
other jurisdiction has in the specific information sought, and the pos-
sibility of obtaining the same information by alternative techniques.
Requiring American courts to consider and balance the interests
of other jurisdictions before issuing a discovery order or imposing
any sanctions for noncompliance in a transnational lawsuit is a logi-
cal extension of the "balancing of interests" test used to determine
whether courts should exercise jurisdiction in the first instance. 48 In-
deed, it seems proper for our courts to give even greater weight to
foreign interests in the context of discovery demands than such for-
eign interests receive in the jurisdictional context.47
The Restatement recognizes that the preferred sanction for fail-
ure to comply with a discovery order will be "findings of fact ad-
verse" to the party that has failed to comply with the court's order.
4 8
The Comment to the Restatement states that an adverse finding of
fact is appropriate:
only if there is reason to believe that the information, if dis-
closed, would-be adverse to the non-complying party, and if the
court is satisfied that the request was made in good faith, not in
the hope that the opposing party's non-compliance would enable
the requesting party to establish a fact that it could not establish
if all the information were available. 9
Although this approach makes a good deal of sense, it may be
difficult to apply. It would certainly be inequitable to permit any
party to secure a judgment based on a judicially imposed determina-
tion of "fact" that could not have been established by relevant evi-
dence. An adverse finding of fact against a noncomplying party
should be imposed only when the court has reason to believe that the
document or information ordered to be produced would have sup-
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, at § 420(2)(b).
46. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. In Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the district court articulated a similar
view:
Also, as has been mentioned previously, while this Court gains jurisdiction
over defendant because of its frequency of business here, it is other factors, such
as the recognition of defendant's foreign residency and the principles of interna-
tional comity, which govern the decision of the Court to utilize the discovery
procedures outlined in the Convention.
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) (18 Av. Cas.) 17,222, 17,233-
24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1983).
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, at § 420(2)(c).
49. Id. at § 420(l)(a) or 2(c).
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ported the requesting party's factual contention. Otherwise, a party
whose defense was dependent on materials located outside the
United States would be at a severe disadvantage. Such a foreign liti-
gant could be caught between the conflicting demand of an Ameri-
can court to produce materials and its own sovereign's order to with-
hold such information.
2. Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.-The scope of American pretrial discovery is undergoing a
more general transformation. This transformation has special impli-
cations for American discovery abroad. The Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, has proposed numerous amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One such amendment to Rule 26
became effective on August 1, 1983. This amendment clearly places
American discovery under greater judicial supervision.
Rule 26(b)(1), as amended, provides that the trial court, upon
its own initiative, may limit both domestic and foreign discovery if:
(i) it is cumulative or duplicative; (ii) some other source of informa-
tion is more convenient; (iii) the party seeking discovery has already
had ample opportunity to obtain the information sought; or (iv) the
discovery sought is unduly burdensome or expensive, given the na-
ture of the case and the limits on the parties' resources.50 These revi-
sions, which invite wider judicial supervision of American litigants'
discovery efforts, promise to restrain efforts at discovery abroad in a
fashion consistent with Section 420 of the Restatement.
3. The Hague Convention.-The Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 5 (the
Convention) is a relatively untested device designed to harmonize
foreign discovery with principles of international comity. The precise
purpose of the Convention was to minimize conflict between sover-
eigns when discovery is sought abroad. 52 The Convention intended to
establish a method of gathering evidence " 'tolerable' to the authori-
ties of the State where it is taken and at the same time 'utilizable' in
the forum where the action will be tried."
53
The effectiveness of the Convention in resolving conflicts be-
tween American and foreign courts has not yet been fully tested.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (as amended).
51. Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
52. Id. at preamble and art. 1.
53. Report of the United States Delegation to the Hague Conference, 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 785, 806 (1969).
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Although the Convention has been available to litigants in American
courts since October 7, 1972, when it became effective in the United
States, it has not been extensively used. As a result there are rela-
tively few American judicial opinions interpreting the Convention.
Recently, however, a few judicial decisions have been handed down
which suggest that the utility of the Convention is beginning to be
recognized.54
These decisions have addressed the question of whether an
American litigant must seek discovery abroad pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Convention before attempting to use the federal or local
rules. This question was first addressed in Volkswagenwerk A.G. v.
Superior Court.55 The trial court in this case ordered Volkswagen-
werk (VW), pursuant to the local California rules, to permit inspec-
tion of its plant, documents, and records and to give other discovery
in Wolfsburg, West Germany. VW sought review of the trial court's
order arguing, inter alia, that compliance with the discovery order
would require it to violate West German law. The California court
of appeals reversed the trial court and vacated the discovery order.
In so doing, the court of appeals reviewed federal precedent in this
area and noted that federal courts "generally apply the 'balancing
approach' only when the responding party has failed to give full dis-
covery and seeks to avoid sanctions by asserting the conflict of sover-
eign demands upo it."'56 The court of appeals went on to extend this
balancing approach by applying it at an earlier stage when discovery
is sought, rather than only after compliance with a discovery order
has been refused. This approach is in harmony with Section 420 of
the Restatement. The court of appeals ultimately held that the "trial
court, in the exercise of judicial restraint based on international
comity, should have declined to proceed other than under the Hague
Convention at this stage."57
The Volkswagenwerk case is a step toward resolution of the
conflict existing between American and foreign discovery practices.
It is, however, not without remaining difficulties. Article 23 of the
Convention permits a contracting state to declare that it will not exe-
cute letters of request issued for the specific purpose of obtaining
pretrial discovery as known in the common-law nations. 8 With the
exception of the United States, all contracting states, including West
Germany, have made such declarations. In view of West Germany's
54. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
55. 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1982).
56. Id. at 857-858, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (emphasis in original); cf. Societe Internatio-
nale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211-12 (1958).
57. Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885; accord Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court,
137 Cal. App. 3d 228, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982).
58. Supra note 51, at art. 23.
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reservation under Article 23 of the Convention, it is clear that a Ger-
man court could refuse to execute the letter of request that the
Volkswagenwerk court anticipated would be filed by plaintiff in
seeking its pretrial discovery of VW in West Germany.
This need not, however, prove to be an insurmountable problem.
There is already some basis to believe that foreign authorities will
adopt a flexible approach in responding to discovery requests made
pursuant to the Convention despite reservations taken under Article
23. For example, in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,59 the House of Lords held that the United Kingdom's reserva-
tion under Article 23 of the Convention was inapplicable where the
requesting court stated that the evidence sought was for the purpose
of trial as well as pretrial discovery. Where the foreign court is able
to consider particularized requests for documents and information, it
may be more inclined to authorize production than when confronted
with an omnibus demand for marginally relevant material. A work-
ing compromise could be developed in which American courts re-
strict the scope of discovery abroad and foreign jurisdictions author-
ize production of material that is clearly relevant to the issues at
trial.
The California approach embodied in Volkswagenwerk has been
followed and strengthened by a district court in Illinois in Schroeder
v. Lufthansa German Airlines.6 In that case, Lufthansa sought a
protective order to enjoin plaintiff's discovery efforts for failure to
make an initial application under the Hague Convention. The dis-
trict court adopted the reasoning of the California court in Volkswa-
genwerk and suggested in a footnote that "[i]t may be that the
Hague Convention does more than suggest a means of procedure
whereby important international goals can be effectuated. If, as de-
fendant postures, the Convention is a preemptive and exhaustive rule
of evidence gathering, then it is binding on this Court .... ,,61 Al-
though the district court declined to rule that the Hague Convention
is preemptive, it clearly recognized the trend toward greater use of
the Convention.
In its decision, the district court relied, in part, on the opinion of
Justice O'Connor, sitting as Circuit Justice, in Volkswagenwerk
A.G. v. Falzon.62 In that case, Justice O'Connor granted a stay of a
,Michigan court's order to depose German nationals residing in Ger-
many. The stay was granted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 44.4.
VW had argued that such depositions could not be taken absent use
59. 1978 A.C. 547.
60. 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) (18 Av. Cas.) 17,222 (N.D. Il1. Sept. 15, 1983).
61. Id. at 17,224 n.1.
62. 461 U.S. 1303 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice, 1983).
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of the methods provided under the Hague Convention. Justice
O'Connor agreed and noted that "there was a significant chance that
the applicant [VW] would prevail" in its appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court.63
There is, of course, a diversity of views among trial courts as to
the role the Hague Convention should play in transnational discov-
ery in American litigation."' The sound of change is, however, in the
air. Hopefully, satisfactory accommodations of competing national
interests will be possible.
IV. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
A. Recognition and Enforcement of United States Judgments
Abroad
A plaintiff who has secured a judgment from an American court
against a foreign defendant has good reason to be pleased but may
face problems in attempting to satisfy the judgment. If the defen-
dant is unwilling to comply with the judgment and has insufficient
assets in the United States against which the judgment can be en-
forced, it will be necessary for the plaintiff to initiate proceedings
abroad for the recognition and enforcement of the American judg-
ment. Indeed, there may even be obstacles to enforcement of an
American judgment within the United States.
1. International Conventions.-There is no settled customary
rule of international law regarding transnational recognition and en-
forcement of judgments.65 Courts of each nation have traditionally
applied that nation's own rules in determining whether to honor a
judgment rendered in another nation.66 The standards applied by dif-
63. Id. at 1304.
64. Compare Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D.111. 1984) with the
cases herein discussed. See R. von Mehren, supra note 33.
65. The terms "recognition" and "enforcement" have distinct meanings, although
sometimes used interchangeably by courts. A foreign judgment is recognized when a court
concludes that a certain matter has already been decided by the judgment and therefore need
not be litigated further. A foreign judgment is enforced when a party is accorded the relief to
which the judgment entitles him.
66. In the United States, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has
developed almost entirely as a matter of common law, rather than statutory law. It is generally
recognized that until such time as the federal government preempts the area by treaty or
statute-which it has not yet done-state rather than federal law governs the treatment of
such judgments. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.4th 1109 (1982).
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), involving a
French judgment, remains a reasonably accurate statement of United States law. A foreign
judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement, under general principles of international
comity, where the rendering court had jurisdiction over the parties and property in question in
a manner consonant with American concepts of due process and judicial power; adequate no-
tice of the foreign proceedings and opportunity to be heard was given; the judgment was not
obtained by fraud; the rendering jurisdiction has impartial tribunals and proceedings; and rec-
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ferent nations are essentially similar, particularly with regard to
common-law nations. Real certainty in this area, however, has only
been achieved through conclusion of bilateral or multilateral conven-
tions.6 7 Such international agreements currently govern recognition
and enforcement of judgments among many nations of Europe and
the British Commonwealth. Unfortunately, the United States is not
party to any of these agreements.
Bilateral agreements between European nations governing recip-
rocal recognition and enforcement of judgments have existed for
many years. In 1966 the Hague Conference in Private International
Law adopted a Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.68 The
United States and most European nations participated in the prepa-
ration of, and ultimately approved, the draft Hague Convention.
While this draft Hague Convention reflects essentially unanimous
expert opinion in the Western world concerning transnational recog-
nition and enforcement of money judgments, it never entered into
force. Alternatively, the six original member States of the European
Economic Community 9 subscribed to the Brussels Convention of 27
September 1968 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters. 70 New member States are obliged to
accede to this Convention.
71
Scholars in this country have long advocated conclusion of trea-
ties governing judgment recognition. From 1973 until 1980, the
United States and the United Kingdom negotiated unsuccessfully for
a bilateral convention on foreign judgments. 72 Besides harmonizing
ognition and enforcement would not contravene local public policy. However, the requirement
of reciprocity in recognition practice with other nations, embraced by the Hilton Court as an
element of comity, has since lost favor in this country. A foreign-country judgment entitled to
recognition is usually enforceable in the same or similar manner as the judgment of a sister
state which is entitled to full faith and credit. See generally R. von Mehren & Patterson,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37 (1974).
There are few state statutes dealing directly with foreign-country judgments, except for
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 (Uniform Recognition Act),
which has been adopted to date by twelve states-Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. UNIF.
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 417 (1962). This Act, applicable
only to money judgments, was not intended to enact new principles of recognition but merely
to codify the common law. Id.
67. The general United Kingdom practice, which has been subject to various codifica-
tions over the years, is essentially the same as that in the United States. See Zaphiriou, Trans-
national Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 734, 749-
58 (1978).
68. Opened for signature Mar. 17, 1969, in 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 362, 369 (1967). See
also Supplementary Protocol of October 15, 1966. Id. at 369.
69. Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands.
70. 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 299) 32 (1972), translated in 2 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 1 6003 (updated).
71. Id. at 6067.
72. Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
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the already similar practices of these two nations, this treaty was
expected to be the first in a network of agreements designed to regu-
larize recognition practice in the United States and improve pros-
pects for recognition and enforcement of United States judgments
abroad. The project foundered largely because of the objections of
insurance interests and others on the British side concerning the very
high damages available in American courts.
2. General Principles of Comity.-In the absence of treaties,
reciprocal recognition practices of the United States and other na-
tions are governed by general principles of international comity.
These principles are embodied in national or local statutory and case
law.
Hilton v. Guyot7a provides the foundation of modern United
States practice in this area. In Hilton, the Supreme Court noted that
no nation is required to give effect to laws or decrees of another na-
tion. The Court stated, however, that the principle of "comity of na-
tions" suggests that American courts should accord conclusive effect
to foreign judgments, subject to certain conditions and exceptions.
The Court defined this principle as follows:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obli-
gation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other per-
sons who are under the protection of its laws .7 4
Despite its ruling that foreign judgments should generally be
given conclusive effect if they meet specified conditions, the Court
denied conclusive effect to the French judgment in question. This
was because under French law-as under the law of most other na-
tions-an American judgment would not be given conclusive effect,
and the merits of the controversy would be examined anew by
French courts. The Court held that reciprocity and mutuality are
part of the comity of nations. Therefore the judgments of a nation
that does not accord conclusive effect to American judgments are
entitled only to a lesser, prima facie effect.
While the requirements of reciprocity and mutuality as ele-
ments of comity in this area have since lost favor in American
Matters, initialed Oct. 26, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 71 (1977). Further drafts were produced in response to problems raised on the
British side, but negotiations were suspended in 1980.
73. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
74. Id. at 163-64.
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courts,7 5 they have retained their importance in civil-law nations.
Thus, courts of many European and Latin American nations will
not, as a matter of course, give conclusive effect to an American
money judgment even when it is clear that the American court ren-
dering the judgment had jurisdiction and that the proceedings were
fundamentally fair. In the absence of a treaty these foreign courts
must additionally be satisfied that the American court would grant
reciprocal recognition to that country's judgment. Moreover, while
American common law has probably placed fewer obstacles before
enforcement of European judgments than European courts have
placed before enforcement of American judgments, it is often diffi-
cult for a proponent of an American judgment to establish reciproc-
ity because of the absence of statutory authority and the dearth of
case law in many American jurisdictions.
76
For example, the Federal Republic of Germany will recognize
and enforce judgments of other countries with which they have no
treaty relationship (e.g., the United States) only when none of the
grounds for refusal of recognition set forth in Section 328 I of the
German Code of Civil Procedure are present. These grounds relate
to propriety of the foreign court's jurisdiction, adequacy of service of
process, whether the judgment is consistent with "good morals or the
purpose of a German law," and, finally, the existence of
reciprocity.
77
German courts have traditionally interpreted the reciprocity re-
quirement quite strictly. This is illustrated by Rhein and Mosel,78 a
1909 decision of the German Supreme Court arising out of the San
Francisco earthquake. In that case a California judgment against a
German fire insurance company was denied recognition and enforce-
ment even though the then current California statute provided for
reciprocal recognition of foreign courts' judgments if the foreign
court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction under the law of the
foreign country. The German court reasoned that reciprocity was not
assured because a California court could examine the German
court's competency to pass on the subject matter, because the fraud
defense reached further under California law than under German
75. See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 417
(1962) (reciprocity not a precondition for recognition and enforcement of foreign-country
judgments); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment e (1971) (ques-
tioning whether considerations of reciprocity are material).
76. See generally Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil
Judgments, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 734 (1978).
77. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] 328 I (W. Ger.), reprinted in H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 804 (2d ed. 1976). The following discussion is
based upon this text and upon Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Money Judgments in the Federal Republic of Germany, II INT'L LAW. 261, 264 (1977).
78. Judgment of Mar. 26, 1909, Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZ], W. Ger., 1909
RGZ 70,434.
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law, and because California law allowed certain equitable defenses
unknown in German law to enforcement of final judgments.
Recent decisions of the German Supreme Court have been con-
siderably more liberal in interpreting the reciprocity provision. Cur-
rently, reciprocity will be assumed by German courts where recogni-
tion and enforcement of German judgments abroad encounter
obstacles that are no greater than the ones imposed by Germany.
Partial reciprocity, defined as reciprocity for the particular class of
judgment at issue, is held to be sufficient. It is also now settled that
foreign rules need not be identical to German provisions. The only
requirement is that the rules must be essentially equivalent.
In the absence of a uniform American law regarding treatment
of foreign judgments, no determination can be made as to whether
reciprocity exists between Germany-or any other nation-and the
United States. In this connection, one commentator has compared
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform
Recognition Act) to the German provisions governing recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.79 His conclusion is that the
laws are almost completely equivalent. Therefore, at least with re-
spect to money judgments, reciprocity would exist with those Ameri-
can states that have adopted the Uniform Recognition Act. s"
It appears that American states following pure common-law re-
quirements for according conclusive effect to foreign judg-
ments-jurisdiction, proper notice, opportunity to be heard, absence
of fraud, finality, and consistency with public policy 8 -should be
recognized and enforced in Germany because these common-law re-
quirements are similar to the conditions set forth in the German
Code of Civil Procedure. Similarly, French courts, while not requir-
ing reciprocity, do require conditions similar to the common-law re-
quirements noted above before they will grant conclusive effect to a
foreign judgment.a2 Nevertheless, despite the similarity between the
79. U. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 354-57 (2d ed.
1972).
80. Indeed, the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Recognition Act states:
In most states of the Union, the law on recognition of judgments from for-
eign countries is not codified. In a large number of civil law countries, grant of
conclusive effect to money-judgments from foreign courts is made dependent
upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in the United States have in many in-
stances been refused recognition abroad either because the foreign court was not
satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the American jurisdiction
involved or because no certification of existence of reciprocity could be obtained
from the foreign government in countries where existence of reciprocity must be
certified to the courts by the government. Codification by a state of its rules on
the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it
more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized abroad.
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 417 (1962).
81. See supra note 66.
82. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-
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laws of the United States, Germany, and France, reciprocity cannot
be assured.
3. Foreign Hostility to Some Categories of American Judg-
ments.-In addition to the general problems outlined above, litigants
in the United States must be aware of the special hostility in other
nations to certain classes of American judgments. These classes in-
clude judgments resulting from American laws that have extraterri-
torial application and that provide for "punitive" treble damages
(i.e., antitrust laws) and those judgments which have "excessive"
damages.
(a) Antitrust.-Differing concepts of competition and free trade
as well as foreign hostility to the jurisdictional "effects doctrine" ap-
plied in American law 83 have evoked a good deal of reaction abroad
to American antitrust litigation. This adverse reaction has included
both legislative and judicial counter-measures in several countries.84
For example, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth nations
have adopted or are considering, as part as their blocking legislation,
so-called "clawback" and related provisions aimed at American anti-
trust judgments.85
The English Protection of Trading Interests Act provides in sec-
tion 5 that no judgments for multiple damages of any foreign court
may be enforced in the United Kingdom.8 A judgment for multiple
damages is defined as a judgment for an amount determined by mul-
tiplying a figure assessed as compensation for the loss or damage
sustained by a plaintiff.87 The prohibition against enforcement con-
cerns the whole judgment debt. Even that part which is compensa-
tory cannot be enforced if the judgment falls within this definition.
While this provision was designed with treble damage judgments
under section 4 of the Clayton Act in mind, the United Kingdom
Secretary of State is empowered to extend its coverage to judgments
based on other foreign laws relating to business competition, regard-
less of the existence of multiple damages.88
Section 6 of the PTIA, the clawback provision, goes even fur-
ther to counteract treble damage judgments. A "qualifying defen-
dant" may proceed against a person not within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United Kingdom to recover the amount of any damages
MENT OF FOREIGN JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW 57 (1975).
83. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
84. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, § 5(1)-(2), reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 959, at F-I (Apr. 10, 1980).
87. Id. § 5(3).
88. Id. § 5 (2)(b), (4).
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paid by the "qualifying defendant" that exceed compensation for ac-
tual injury.89 Qualified defendants are citizens of the United King-
dom and those companies incorporated or doing business in the
United Kingdom. 9 The only exceptions are for defendants residing
or incorporated in the rendering country (e.g., United States nation-
als and companies), 9 and defendants doing business in the rendering
country if the overseas proceeding concerned activities exclusively
carried on in that country.92
Section 7 of the PTIA enables the Secretary of State to provide
for enforcement in the United Kingdom of clawback judgments ren-
dered by foreign countries, if the foreign country will recognize and
enforce British clawback judgments.9" A situation is thus envisaged
in which a number of countries join together to allow defendants
who have paid sums on account of multiple damage judgments to
recover most of those sums through their own courts.
The Australian Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforce-
ment) Act of 1979, as amended in 1981, is similar to the PTIA.94
Under this law, the Attorney General is authorized to restrict or pre-
vent enforcement of an antitrust judgment rendered by a foreign
court when he is satisfied that the foreign court exercised jurisdiction
or powers, of a kind inconsistent with international law, and recogni-
tion or enforcement of the judgment in Australia might adversely
affect Australian trading interests.95 The 1981 amendment added a
clawback provision similar to that available in the United King-
dom.96 This legislation was further strengthened last year.97
Canada has considered but has not yet enacted similar legisla-
tion as an adjunct to its existing blocking law. 98 Moreover, it has
been suggested that courts in other nations having no clawback law
may also refuse to recognize or enforce an American treble damages
award in accordance with comity-based recognition practice.
(b) Excessive damage awards.-There is unhappiness overseas
not only with antitrust treble damages but with all forms of civil
89. Id. § 6(2).
90. Id. § 6(1).
91. Id. § 6(3).
92. Id. § 6(4).
93. Id. § 7.




97. Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, 1984, assented to 21 March 1984
(Australia).
98. On December 13, 1984, the Canadian House of Commons unanimously passed the
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, which strengthens the former Canadian blocking law
and contains clawback provisions.
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judgments from United States courts for damages that are viewed as
excessive. Indeed, foreign countries dislike our whole system of civil
litigation which breeds such results. Lord Denning gave elaborate
expression to these feelings recently in the opening lines of a
landmark decision of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal enjoining
a British national from pursuing a breach-of-contract action in the
United States:
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he
stands to win a fortune. At no cost to himself: and at no risk of
having to pay anything to the other side. The lawyers there will
conduct the case 'on spec' as we say-or on a 'contingency fee'
as they say. The lawyers will charge the litigant nothing for
their services but instead they will take 40 percent of the dam-
ages-if they win the case in court-or out of court on a settle-
ment. If they lose, the litigant will have nothing to pay to the
other side. The courts in the United States have no such costs
deterrent as we have. There is also in the United States a right
to trial by jury. These are prone to award fabulous damages.
They are notoriously sympathetic and know that the lawyers will
take their 40 percent before the plaintiff gets anything. All this
means that the defendant can be readily forced into a settle-
ment. The plaintiff holds all the cards.99
More to the point, in 1980 the Attorney General of the United
Kingdom explained to Parliament the suspension of negotiations
with the United States on a reciprocal recognition and enforcement
treaty as follows:
A substantial proportion of the bodies which commented on the
consultative paper felt that a convention might be harmful in
view of the very high damages awarded by American juries, es-
pecially in personal injury and product liability cases; and that it
would not be possible to devise any means of mitigating the en-
forcement of such judgments which would not be excessively dif-
ficult to operate in practice. Taking these and other views into
consideration, Her Majesty's Government have decided not to
pursue negotiations on a draft convention, and have so informed
the United States authorities.1 "
In short, an American judgment creditor should expect to encounter
special difficulties in attempting to obtain foreign recognition and en-
forcement of a substantial award of damages in many types of cases.
99. Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (Q.B. 1983).
100. 987 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 267 (1980). See supra pp. 56-58.
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B. Enforcement within the United States
A prospective judgment creditor may also have occasion to seek
enforcement and execution of an American judgment against a for-
eign entity within this country if the foreign entity has United States
based assets. In so doing, one should have in mind the general princi-
ples and special problems involved if the defendant is, or is con-
trolled by, a foreign sovereign.
1. General Principles.-When enforcement is sought within
the state whose court has rendered the judgment the plaintiff need
only be concerned with execution procedures and practices of that
state. Various states also provide numerous provisional and final
remedies to which a judgment creditor may resort pending judgment
or in aid of judgment. These generally include attachment and sale
of real or personal property, discovery procedures to locate such
property, receiverships, penalties for contempt of court orders, and,
in some cases, arrest of the judgment debtor.' 0 ' These are all availa-
ble against a foreign defendant, subject to the considerations dis-
cussed below.
It may be necessary to seek enforcement of a judgment of one
state in another state, in which event the normal rules governing en-
forcement of sister-state judgments will apply. Traditionally, a sis-
ter-state judgment would have had to have been transformed into a
judgment of a local court and then could have been enforced by all
means available under local law. Consistent with the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution, however, expedited procedures for
action on such judgments are available. At the very least, summary
judgment may be granted for the plaintiff absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Moreover, about half the states have adopted the Uni-
form Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Uniform Enforcement
Act) 0 1 which provides that duly authenticated sister-state judgments
may simply be filed in the county clerk's office of the enforcing state.
The judgment will then be treated as a judgment of a court of that
state for purposes of enforcement or satisfaction. 0 3
101. In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts gener-
ally grant the provisional and final remedies, and follow the procedures and practices on execu-
tion of the state in which they sit. FED. R. Civ. P. 64-71. See generally 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1U 64.01-.10 (2d ed. 1983).
102. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 176 (1964 & Supp.
1984).
103. Although the Uniform Enforcement Act does not by its terms apply to foreign-
country money judgments, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides
that a judgment entitled to recognition is enforceable "in the same manner as the judgment of
a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit." UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. 417, 420 (1962). Thus, the direct enforcement procedure




2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.-Claimants
against foreign entities must be particularly sensitive to the potential
applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), 1'0 with respect to both jurisdiction and execution upon judg-
ment. The FSIA applies to litigation in any court of this country
against a "foreign state." Foreign state is defined to include any
agency or instrumentality of the foreign nation that is "a separate
legal person, corporate or otherwise, and . . . which is an organ of a
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or po-
litical subdivision thereof . .. .,,o5
The provisions of the FSIA are intricate and will not be re-
viewed in depth here. 06 Basically, the FSIA adopts the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity under which foreign States are enti-
tled to immunity from liability arising out of their governmental acts
but are not entitled to immunity from claims concerning their com-
mercial conduct.10 7 With respect to immunity from execution, the
following general statements can be made: If the defendant is a com-
mercial enterprise or agency that is majority owned or controlled by
a foreign state, and jurisdiction exists by virtue of that entity's com-
mercial activities, execution (or attachment in aid of execution) upon
judgment may be had against any property owned by that entity in
the United States. If the defendant is a foreign state or political sub-
division thereof and jurisdiction exists because of the defendant's
commercial activity, attachment or execution may be had only
against the property that is or was used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based.'
There is an additional provision allowing execution in certain
circumstances against property that has been "taken in violation of
international law" or that has been exchanged for property so taken.
Another provision allows execution when the foreign state or state-
controlled entity has waived immunity from execution. 0 9 Prejudg-
ment attachments against property of foreign states are prohibited
unless there is an explicit waiver of such immunity and the attach-
ments are in aid of a prospective judgment and are not being used to
obtain jurisdiction. Finally, there is absolute or near absolute immu-
nity from attachment or execution on a foreign state's property that
104. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
106. See R. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, reprinted in
SOUTHWEST LEGAL FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD (1977).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
108. Id. § 1610.
109. Id. Such waivers are commonly included in commercial contracts or friendship,
commerce and navigation treaties to which the United States is a partner.
Fall 1984]
66 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
is closely associated with the state's exercise of sovereign func-
tions.110 Obviously, a close analysis of the FSIA, pertinent treaties,
and case law must be made in each individual case.
V. Conclusion
A few propositions may be stated for careful consideration by
American counsel in determining whether an American jurisdiction
should be selected for transnational litigation in preference to an al-
ternative foreign jurisdiction. First, the choice of an American juris-
diction should not be automatic. Second, depending upon the type of
case, trial of the matter to a judge, as would be true of most com-
mercial cases tried in jurisdictions other than the United States, may
well lead to a more effective and less costly judicial proceeding than
would a trial by jury. Third, with respect to preparation for and trial
of certain types of cases, it may be advantageous to choose a civil-
law country in which the judge will play a leading role in develop-
ment of evidence and the trial itself. Fourth, when the governing law
is that of a foreign jurisdiction, it may be beneficial to try the case in
that jurisdiction. Fifth, if the location of the defendant and his assets
makes it likely that the only jurisdiction in which one would wish to
execute on any judgment is the defendant's jurisdiction, that juris-
diction should be carefully considered as the place of trial. Sixth, if
the plaintiff does not need wide-ranging discovery, the advantages of
avoiding such discovery by litigating in an alternative foreign forum
should be considered.
The interplay of these six factors and many others in any partic-
ular case may be very complex. Each particular situation should be
analyzed carefully to select the best available forum.
110. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611.
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